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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAXES AND
THE CYCLICAL AND SEASONAL PROPERTIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
ABSTRACT
We combine Current Population Survey microdata for 1979-1987 with a newly
assembled database of tax rates for the Unemployment Insurance system to measure the
effects of imperfect experience-rating on temporary layoffs and other types of unemployment.
We find a strong negative association between the degree of experience-rating and the rate of
temporary layoff unemployment, with the largest effect in recessionary years and the smallest
effect in expansionary years. Increases in the degree of experience-rating are also associated
with dampened seasonal fluctuations in temporary layoffs, particularly in construction and
durable manufacturing. The correlation between the degree of experience-rating and the
unemployment rate of permanent job losers is smaller but also negative, whereas the
correlation with the unemployment Me of job quitters and re-entrants is negligible. Attempts
to concrol for the endogeneity of unemployment insurance taxes are consistent with a causal










Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the
Cyclical and Seasonal Properties of Unemployment
A unique feature of the U.S. unemployment insurance system is its experience-
rated tax structure. Firms whose previous employees have collected more unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits are charged higher payroll taxes. Nevertheless, employers in
most states are only partially experience-rated: the tax increases generated by an
additional UI claim cover only a fraction of the benefits paid. Because of the implicit
subsidy on UI benefits, it is argued that firms have an incentive to hold an excess
inventory of workers and cycle them through spells of temporary unemployment.'
Indeed, estimates presented by Feldstein (1978) and Topel (1983) suggest that up to one-
half of all temporary layoff unemployment in the US can be attributed to imperfect
experience-rating.
While the effects of imperfect experience-rating are easily identified in a
stationary environment, in a cyclical or seasonal environment the effects vary with the
state of demand. Experience-rated UI taxe~ introduce a layoff or firing cost into the
firm's inter temporal optimization decision. Increases in the degree of experience-rating
raise this adjustment cost, creating an incentive for firms to layoff fewer workers in a
recession and hire fewer workers in a boom. Imperfect experience-rating therefore
generates more temporary layoffs and greater unemployment in a trough, but higher
employment (and possibly lower unemployment) at the peak of the cycle.
'This point is developed formally in models by Feldstein (1976), Baily (1977) and
Brechling (1977).
2In this paper we use a newly assembled database of experience-rating factors for
individual states and industries to measure the effects of imperfect experience-rating at
different points in the demand cycle. Vsing Current Population Survey microdata from
1979 to 1987, we estimate the effect of experience-rating on temporary layoff
unemployment rates during the cyclical downturn in the early 1980s, and in the
expansionary periods before and after. We also examine the effects in different months
of the year. As an informal check on the results, we estimate similar models for the
unemployment rates of permanent job-losers and non-jab-losers (job-quitters and labor
force re-entrants). We find a strong negative correlation between the degree of
experience-rating and the rate of temporary layoff unemployment in recessionary years,
but smaller and unsystematic correlations in expansionary years. Likewise, temporary
layoff rates in high-unemployment months are strongly negatively correlated with the
degree of experience rating. By comparison, there is no relation between experience-
rating and the unemployment rate of quitters and labor force re-entrants.
A major difficulty in the empirical analysis is the potential endogeneity of VI tax
rates. Since each state's VI system has a maximum tax rate, industries with the highest
unemployment rates may not be experience-rated at all. We present instrumental
variables estimates that use only the features of the state tax system (and not the actual
unemployment experience of firms in the state) to identify the experience-rating effect.
We also examine the effects of experience rating within industries, and find negative
effects in services and trade, where few firms are at the maximum of the tax schedule.
3On balance, we believe the evidence is broadly consistent with a causal link between
experience rating and the use of temporary layoffs.
J. EMPLOYMENT AND TEMPORARY LAYOFFS IN A CYCLICAL
ENVIRONMENT
This section presents a simple model of employment determination in the
presence of cyclical demand shifts. To capture the effects of experience-rating in the VI
tax system we model the pool of recently laid-off workers "attached" to each firm.
Temporarily laid-off workers have a value to the firm, since they can be re-employed in
an upturn without incurring any training or recruiting costs. They also have a cost, since
the VI benefits drawn by these workers are charged back to the firm at a rate that
depends on the degree of experience-rating. In a model with a simple alternating
demand cycle we show how changes in the degree of experience rating affect the firm's
employment and unemployment decisions at the peak and trough of the demand cycle.
In any period t a firm is assumed to have a pool P, of attached workers, consisting
of N, employed workers and V, temporarily unemployed workers. The firm pays a wage
rate w to its employed workers, which we take as exogenous? Its laid-off workers
receive an average unemployment benefit of $B per workeLl It is convenient to express
B as a fraction of the average wage: B = R ow, where R is the net replacement ratio.
2In contrast, Feldstein (1976) and Baily (1977) take the utility level of workers as
exogenous and treat the wage as endogenous.
lOnly a fraction of laid-off workers receive any unemployment benefits. Thus B
represents the product of the fraction receiving benefits and the ave~;age benefit per worker,
conditional on receiving benefits. See below.
4The cost to the firm of the unemployment benefits received by its laid-off workers is (I-
s) of the total, where s is the implicit subsidy generated by incomplete experience-rating
of the VI tax system. For simplicity, we treat s as fixed and exogenous, although long-
run differences in the firm's layoff policy can obviously affect the value of s. We defer
discussion of this point to the next section.
Assume that a fraction 0 of workers who are employed in period t quit during the
period and that a fraction 0+L\ of workers on temporary lay-off move to other jobs. If
laid-off workers have a higher attrition rate than those with jobs, then L\ > O. The
available pool of workers in period t depends on the size of the pool in the previous
period and on the number of new-hires (AJ;
P, = (I-O)P'l - L\U,.IP•.I + A." (I)
here U t == VJPt is the fraction of workers on lay-off. We assume that A,~ 0, which
implies that the firm cannot freely dispose of workers. Rather, excess workers are
released into the pool of attached unemployed workers. We also assume that new-hires
are costly and denote the per-worker recruiting and training cost by pw. Finally, we
assume that the revenues of the firm in period t have the simple form e,f(N,), where f( )
is an increasing and strictly concave production function and e. denotes a relative
demand shock in period t. With this set-up, the net profits of the firm in period tare
(2)
5The firm is assumed to maximize E, {3'1ru subject to 0~ u,~ 1 and 1\ 2.. 0, where (3 is a
discount factor.·
Let S, denote the shadow value of an attached worker in period t. The first order
conditions for profit maximization include
IJ, f(N,) - w(l - (l-s)R) + ~{3S'+I2.. 0, with equality when u, > 0, (3)
S,~ pw, with equality when 1\ > 0, (4)
and
(1-u.)1J, f(N,) - w(l-u.) - wu,(l-s)R -S, + {3(1-c5)S'+1 - (3liU,S'+1 = O.
Using equations (2) and (4) the shadow value of an attached worker can be written as
S, .. lJ,f(N.) - w + {3(l-o)S,+!, if U, = 0
and
(Sa)
S, .. -w(l-s)R + {3(l-c5-~)S'+I' if U, > O. (Sb)
These conditions describe the evolution of S, in states of full-employment and
unemployment. When attached workers are fully employed the shadow value of a
worker is his or her marginal product, minus the cost of wages, plus the expected future
shadow value (discounted by (3(l-o) to reflect the quit rate 0). If some attached workers
are unemployed, however, the shadow value is the expected future shadow value
(discounted by (3(l-c5-li) to reflect the attrition rate o+li) minus the firm's UI costs.
'This formulation ignores UI taxes that do not depend on the number of layoffs
generated by the firm. While such taxes are important, their inclusion does not directly
affect the layoff decision of the firm, and we ignore them.
6For a given sequence of (Jt (t=1. ..T) the first order conditions can be solved for a
sequence of shadow values So unemployment rates Uo and employment levels Nt. The
solution of these equations is particularly simple when (J, follows a deterministic cycle.
For our purposes it is sufficient to consider a case where (J, alternates between a high
value (Jh and a low value (Jj' In this case, if we assume a stationary solution and that
there are temporary layoffs in the low-demand state, then equations (Sa) and (Sb) lead
to
and
Sl = 13(1-0-A)Sh - w(1-s)R,
where Ph = Nh is the size of the attached pool in the high-demand state. If we assume
that the production function f( •) has a constant elasticity form with a conventional labor
demand elasticity of -77 (77 > 0) then we can solve explicitly for peak employment Nh and
trough unemployment U j as5
and
- 77(1-s)R(1 + 13(1-0» - o.
5These expressions ignore constants and make (liberal) use of the approximation log
(1+r) = r.
7These expressions indicate that peak employment is decreasing in the firm's marginal VI






au, = - T/ R (1 + P(1-O»,
a(l-s)
are proportional to the product of the conventional labor-demand elasticity T/ and the
average VI replacement rate R. Vsing the fact that the level of trough employment is N,
= (l-u,)(I-o)Pb' the proportional gap between peak and trough employment can be
written as:
log(NJN1) .. T/log(8b/81) - T/p{AP + 1 - P2(1-0)(I-c5-Il)}
- T/(I-s)R(1 + P(1-o»,
which is also decreasing in the firm's marginal VI cost.
In this model an increase in the marginal tax cost of a layoff has two important
effects. First, holding constant the size of the attached pool, it leads to a decrease in the
temporary layoff rate in low-demand periods. Second, it leads to a decrease in the
cyclical amplitude of employment fluctuations, since firms with higher VI costs have
lower employment at the peak of the demand cycle and higher employment at the
trough.
8The magnitudes of these effects depend on the size of the demand elasticity (I)), the
replacement rate (R), the discount rate ({3), and the quit rate of employed workers (0).
To fLx ideas suppose that time is measured in 6-month intervals and that a complete
cycle lasts 1 year (as is the case for a seasonal cycle). Suppose that I) = 0.3, {3 = 0.9,
and 0 = 0.1. Suppose in addition that one-half of layoffs generate a VI claim6, that VI
payments are received for an average of 12 weeks by those who start a claim, and that
the average ratio of VI benefits to wages among VI recipients is 0.5. Then a 0.1
increase in the marginal tax cost of a layoff is predicted to lower the temporary layoff
unemployment rate by .003 (0.3 percent). Since the temporary layoff unemployment rate
in a trough averages 1.8 - 2.0 percent (see below), this is a relatively large effect. On the
other hand, the same change in the VI subsidy rate is predicted to raise peak-level
employment by about 0.14 percent -- a small effect.
The implications of this simple deterministic model can be generalized by considering
a model with stochastic transitions between high- and low-demand states, as in Bertola
(1990). If demand follows a first-order Markov process, the firm's optimal policy
specifies a peak employment level (in the high-demand state), a trough employment level
(in the low demand state), and a temporary unemployment rate (in low-demand states)
that reflects the gap between the size of the attached pool and the optimal employment
level. As in a deterministic model, increases in the marginal tax cost of a layoff lower
6Anderson (1991b) uses individual and firm-level VI records to measure the ratio of VI
claims to total separations for a broad sample industries and states. She reports an average
of 0.15 claims per separation (among separations that last one quarter or more).
9the level of employment in the high-demand state, raise the level of employment in the
trough, and reduce the layoff unemployment rate in low-demand states.
II. EXPERIENCE·RATING IN THE UI TAX SYSTEM
These theoretical results highlight the importance of the degree of experience-
rating in determining the layoff and employment decisions of employers. In this section
we describe the UI tax systems used in a majority of states and outline our procedures
for estimating the degree of experience·rating for a representative firm in a particular
state and industry.
a. Typical UI Tax Systems
The UI program is financed by a payroll tax on the earnings of covered employees.
Although the federal government sets guidelines for the program, each state has its own
method for determining the tax rate for individual employers. Most state systems are
minor variants of two basic plans -- the "benefit-ratio" system, used in 6 states, and the
"reserve-ratio" system, used in 32 others.7 States using these systems accounted for 77
percent of workers covered by the UI program in 1987. The tax systems in the other 12
7More sophisticated versions of these systems, which compute the relevant ratio for each
firm and then charge a tax based on the firm's relative ranking among all firms, exist in six
states (reserve ratio: Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Vermont. Benefit ratio: Iowa and
Oregon). We omit these states in our analysis.
Becker (1972) and Topel (1990) provide more detailed descriptions of the UI tax
system. Our derivation of the marginal tax cost of a layoff is similar to Topel (1983, 1984,
1985, 1990).
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states do not permit simple calculations of the marginal tax cost of a layoff, and we have
therefore excluded these states from our empirical analysis.
The benefit-ratio system ties a firm's UI tax rate to the ratio of the benefits drawn by
the firm's employees over the past 3 years to the size of its taxable payroll during those
years.! Let C, represent the average weekly number of UI recipients originating from a
given firm in year t. If the firm's average employment level is No then the firm's insured
unemployment rate is defined as III = CJN,. Assuming that the average UI benefit in
year t is B, and that a fraction a of claims originating from former employees of the firm
are actually charged to the firm, the benefits charged to the firm in year t are aBI~ =
aBJLtN/ The firm's benefit-ratio in year t (BR,) is then:
!In one state that uses a benefit-ratio system (Minnesota) the average is taken over the
previous 5 years.
9Approximately 15 percent of all UI benefits paid in the US are uncharged. There are
a wide variety of circumstances leading to uncharged benefits. For example, South Carolina
does not charge employers for benefits drawn by recipients with fewer than 8 weeks of
claims (leading to 40 percent of benefits being uncharged) --see U.S. Department of Labor
Employment and Training Administration (1991, page 2-37). Similarly, dependent's
allowances are not charged in some states; while only a fraction of ill benefits drawn by






where WI is the firm's taxable wage base in the state in year t. 1O The UI tax rate is a
function of the benefit-ratio, subject to a minimum and maximum rate. Specifically,
between the minimum and maximum rates, Tmin and Taaxo the firm is charged a tax rate T,
1ft + >-,BR, where the parameters If, and >-, vary by state and year.
From equation (6) it is clear that a firm's benefit-ratio is a function of its past
insured unemployment rates. A firm with a constant insured unemployment rate /"' will
face rising or falling tax rates until the annual benefits charged to the firm equal the
taxes paid in. This equality defines a "steady-state" tax rate T' = a(WIE) '/"', assuming
that the ratio of the taxable wage base W to the average UI benefit B is constant. If
r' > Tmax or
r' < Tmin then the firm's benefit-ratio grows or declines continuously and its MTC is zero.
Otherwise, in steady-state the firm is located on the sloped portion of the tax schedule
with a positive MTC.
Suppose that an extra dollar of UI benefits is charged to a firm with Tmin < T' < Tmax•
If employment and the taxable wage base are constant, this will increase the benefit ratio
'''The UI payroll tax is only applied on the first W, dollars of an employee's annual
earnings. At present, the taxable wage base varies across states from $7,000 to over $20,000,
with most states in the $7,000-$14,000 range.
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by 1/(3 . W . N) in each of the next three years. ll The resulting increase in the tax rate,
applied to the taxable payroll, will increase tax payments by f../3 in each year. In the
absence of discounting, a value of A = 1 therefore implies a marginal tax cost of 1 (Le.,
perfect experience rating). With a positive discount rate the marginal tax cost is lower
since the tax payments are made 1, 2, and 3 years in the future. On the other hand, if
the taxable wage is growing over time or employment is trending upward, the MTC will
be higher since the higher tax rate will be applied to a growing taxable payroll. In
Appendix 1 we show that:
(7)
where i is the (real) interest rate, 7r is the growth rate of the taxable wage base, and g is
the growth rate of employment. For example, if g = 0.02, 7r = 0.01, and i = 0.10, then
MTC = 0.88 ex A.
Under a reserve-ratio financing system, a "bank account" is established for each
firm, with tax payments added to the account and UI benefits drawn from it. The
reserve ratio (r,) is the ratio of the reserves in the firm's account (RES,) to a three-year
rolling average of its taxable payroll:
llIf the benefit-ratio is defined over the previous 5 years, the calculation is similar.
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A finn's VI tax rate is a decreasing function of its reserve-ratio, subject to a
minimum and a maximum rate. A typical schedule specifies a series of steps with
variable step-sizes at different reserve ratios. We use a linear spline function to
approximate the segments of the tax schedule, as illustrated in Figure 1.
(8)
The calculation of the firm's MTC under a reserve-ratio system is similar to the
calculation under a benefit-ratio system. A steady state tax rate, T', is calculated by
setting VI tax payments equal to VI benefits charged at some steady-state insured
unemployment rate. If.,. > T.... or T' < T<nin, the MTC is zero and the firm's reserve
ratio tends to infinity or O. If T.... < T' < T.,.., the firm's MTC is positive. However,
calculation of the MTC in most states is complicated by the existence of several
segments in the tax schedule. Define Tlaw and Thj as end points of a particular segment
with Tlaw < .,. < Thj. The relevant slope of the tax schedule is then the slope between Tlaw
and Thj, which we denote by ~ (see Figure 1).
If employment and taxable wages are constant then the existence of a steady-state
tax rate implies that the firm's reserves are constant. It follows that the undiscounted tax
liabilities generated by an additional dollar of VI benefits must be equal to $1,
independent of the value of ~ (although the dollar will be paid back more quickly for
higher values of n. However, the discounted tax liabilities generated by an additional
dollar of VI benefits are less than 1; a reserve-ratio finance system necessarily offers a
14
subsidy to the VI costs of a firm with constant employment that is larger in states with
smaIler values of~. This may be offset if the taxable wage base is rising over time, or if
the firm's employment is growing over time. In Appendix 1 we show that an
approximate formula for the MTC in a reserve-ratio state is:
MTC nC1 +g)2(l +1t)2~
i + (l+gf(l+1tf~
(9)
where g represents the growth rate of employment, 11" represents the growth rate of the
taxable wage base, and i is the discount rate.
b. Marginal Tax Costs By State and Industry
Two pieces of information are needed to calculate the steady-state MTC facing a
particular firm: its long-run average insured unemployment rate, and the relevant state
tax schedule. Unfortunately, firm-specific data on average insured unemployment rates
are unavailable. Instead, we use industry average insured unemployment rates by state
to calculate the marginal tax cost for a "representative firm" whose insured
unemployment rate equals the overall state average. J2 Industry level data are available
for five broad industry groups: construction, durable manufacturing, nondurable
manufacturing, services, and trade. We estimate the steady state insured unemployment
I20ne difficulty with this procedure is that it ignores the variation in MTCs across firms
within a state and industry. Thus, if insured unemployment rates in a state and industry are
high enough, that state and industry is assigned a MTC of 0, even though some firms may
still face a positive MTC. Topel (1985) addresses this issue by modelling a distribution of
MTCs within state and industry cells. Anderson (1991a) uses firm-specific tax rates and
employment data, which are available for a small set of states.
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rate in an industry and state by the average rate during 1978-1987D We also estimate
the long-run growth rate of employment (g) by the average growth rate of covered
employment in the state and industry over the period.
We have collected annual tax schedules for 1978-1987 for each of the states that
use either a benefit-ratio or reserve-ratio tax system. The schedules were obtained from
a variety of sources, including Unemployment Insurance Reporter and the individual
states' Departments of Employment Security. In benefit-ratio states, the slope of the tax
schedule in any year (the parameter A) is reported explicitly. For reserve-ratio states we
approximate the steps in the tax schedule with a series of linear splines and estimate the
slope of the schedule for each reserve ratio." In total, we have tax schedules for 35
states and the District of Columbia for each of the years 1978-87. ll
Examination of the actual tax schedules indicates two problems in implementing
the MTC measures specified in equations (7) and (9). The first is that tax rates vary
systematically over the business cycle. Typically, minimum and maximum tax rates and
the slope of the tax schedule shift up during recessions and down during expansions
13Average annual insured unemployment rates by state and industry are taken from
Unemplovment Insurance Statistics for 1978 and 1979. Rates for 1980 through 1987 were
obtained from unpublished reports of the Department of Employment Security, United
States Department of Labor (we thank Cindy Ambler and Philip Blue for their assistance
in acquiring these data). Rates for some industries in smaller states are not reported in
some years. Because of missing data we omit from our analysis nondurable manufacturing
in the District of Columbia, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Hawaii, durable
manufacturing in the District of Columbia and Hawaii, and construction in Wyoming. The
same data sources provide information on covered employment by state and industry.
l"These approximate schedules are available upon request from the authors.
15We have excluded 2 states (Utah and Virginia) that switched tax systems between 1978
and 1987.
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(usually after a 1 or 2 year lag for the state's VI Trust Fund to show a surplus or
deficit).16 Thus, the tax schedule in a particular year is not always a good estimate of
the tax schedule that will prevail in the near future.
A second problem arises because VI benefits have increased over time at about
the rate of inflation while the taxable wage base has risen much more slowly. From the
steady-state relationship, T' = (B/W)*p.', it is apparent that the tax rate must rise over
time if state VI reserves are to be maintained in the face of a declining real taxable
wage base.17 As shown in Figure 2, this has been the case. Among reserve-ratio states
the average tax rate for firms with negative reserve ratios rose by 35-50 percent over the
1980s. Ideally, one needs information on the expected rate of growth of B/W to
calculate the steady-state MTC. In practice, however, it is difficult to disentangle the
secular growth in tax rates necessitated by the declining real value of the taxable wage
base from the effects of the business cycle. Part of the increase in VI tax rates over the
1980s was driven by the unusually severe 1982-83 downturn, and the subsequent efforts
of the states to replenish their Trust Funds.
Given these difficulties we have elected to use the average tax schedule over the
1978-87 period as a proxy for a states's steady state schedule. This strategy solves the
problem of determining the MTC based on tax rates assigned during a recession or
16In fact, Brown (1986) uses this variation to show that the marginal tax cost is counter-
cyclical. However, her evidence and our own simulations suggest that cyclical changes in
the MTC are relatively small for reasonable discount rates.
17With a fIXed nominal wage base and fully indexed benefits the tax rate must grow at
the rate of inflation in steady state.
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boom. The other parameters required to evaluate the MTC are estimated by their
average values over the ten year period from 1978 to 1987. The taxable wage base by
state and year is taken from Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.
Average weekly benefits in a state and year are taken from Statistical Abstract of the
United States. Finally, the percentage of benefits charged to firms in a given state and
year was obtained from unpublished records of the Department of Employment Security,
United States Department of Labor.!'
The distribution of marginal tax costs across the 36 states and 5 industries in our
data set is illustrated in Figure 3. As previous researchers have noted, the MTC in the
construction industry is zero for all but a handful of states. For other industries, MTCs
cluster around 0.8: only a few state systems impose MTCs greater than one. In general,
states with higher MTCs in one industry tend to have higher costs in all industries. For
example, the benefit-ratio systems in Florida, Texas, and Minnesota set MTCs close to 1
for all industries. At the other extreme, Washington had no experience-rating in its tax
system during our sample period. A complete listing of MTCs by state and industry is
presented in Appendix Table AI.
III. EFFECfS OF EXPERIENCE RATING ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
To measure the effects of experience-rating on the incidence of temporary layoffs
and other types of unemployment we have assembled microdata from the 1979-87
IIWe thank Mike Miller of the Unemployment Insurance Service for his assistance in
acquiring these data.
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Current Population Survey (CPS) merged outgoing-rotation-group files,19 Information
on state-of-residence and current or previous industry allows us to match individual
unemployment outcomes with industry- and state-specific measures of the marginal tax
cost of layoffs. This data set has a number of important advantages for studying the
effects of experience rating. First, the sample period encompasses a full cycle of
economic activity -- from a peak in 1979 to a trough in 1982-83 to a peak in 1987.
Second, the merged outgoing-rotation-group files are drawn from all 12 months of the
year, allowing us to compare the effects of incomplete experience rating at different
points in the seasonal cycle. Finally, the sample size is large: a 50 percent sample of the
available observations yields over 180,000 individuals in 36 states and 5 industries over 9
years.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. We include individuals
in the labor force age 16 and older who report their current or previous industry as
construction, manufacturing (either durable or nondurable), trade, or services. Public-
sector employees, labor force non-participants, and unemployed individuals who report
no previous industry or occupation are excluded.20 The latter restriction eliminates new
entrants to the labor force and others who have not worked in the past 5 years. The
sample is roughly one-half female and about 13 percent non-white. Average education
19'fhese files combine the responses for 1/4 of individuals in every month of the survey.
20State and local employees are covered by the DI system. However, state and local
governments (and many non-profit institutions) self-insure their DI costs. We have
estimated many of our models with samples that include state and local workers (with a
MTC of 1) and obtained similar results to those reported here.
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and experience are approximately the same as the averages for all labor force
participants.
The demographic characteristics of the sample vary across industries. For example,
service industries employ relatively more women and college graduates, whereas retail
and wholesale trade employ a relatively high fraction of young workers. The industry
shares in the overall sample are reported in the bottom row of the table. Trade and
services each account for about 30 percent of the sample, while durable and nondurable
manufacturing and construction are a smaller fraction of the total.
Unemployed individuals are divided into 3 categories: those on temporary layoff
(individuals who report that they have a job from which they are on temporary or
indefinite layoff); permanent job losers (unemployed individuals who do not report
themselves as on lay-off and who report that they began looking for work as a result of a
job loss); and others. The "other" group includes job seekers who quit their previous job
as well as labor force re-entrants -- for this reason we refer to this group as "non-job-
losers." In the overall sample about 18 percent of the unemployed are on temporary
layoff, with the remainder divided between permanent job losers and non-job-losers.
The relative importance of temporary layoffs varies across industries, being highest (close
to one-third) in durable manufacturing and lowest (less than 10%) in trade and services.
Po!; shown in Figure 4, the probability of unemployment and its composition also vary
over the years of the sample. The overall unemployment rate in the sample tracks the
aggregate rate fairly closely, with a peak in 1982 and relative troughs in 1979 and 1987.
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Temporary layoffs also peak in 1982, although their fraction of total unemployment is
similar in 1980 (23%),1981 (20%), and 1982 (21%).
According to the model in Section I, increases in the degree of experience rating
should lower the layoff unemployment rate in a low-demand state, but should have no
effect at a cyclical or seasonal peak. These predictions are based on the behavior of a
single firm. In applying the model to aggregate data it must be recognized that
individual firrns face idiosyncratic as well as macroeconomic shocksY At any point in
time some firms are experiencing a relative peak in demand while others are
experiencing a relative trough. Nevertheless, the fraction of firms facing a peak will vary
systematically over the business cycle or the seasonal cycle. We therefore expect to see a
larger negative effect of experience-rating on temporary layoff unemployment rates in a
recession or a seasonal trough, although not necessarily a zero effect at a cyclical or
seasonal peak.
By comparison, changes in the degree of experience rating should not effect the
incidence of unemployment among non-job-losers, since few non-job-losers are covered
by VI. Job quitters are denied benefits in all but a handful of states. Likewise, most
labor force re-entrants are ineligible for benefits. An analysis of the effects of the MTC
of layoffs on the unemployment rate of non-job-losers thus provides a simple check on
our results: a finding of a significant effect signals a spurious correlation between overall
labor market conditions and the measured degree of experience-rating.
21Indeed, the results of Davis and Haltiwanger (1989) suggest that the idiosyncratic
demand components are substantially bigger than the aggregate components.
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The predicted effect of experience rating on the fraction of permanent job losers is
somewhere between the predicted effect on temporary layoffs and non-job losers.
Increased experience rating imposes a higher cost on both temporary and permanent
layoffs. Thus we expect to see some effect of higher MTC's on the incidence of
permanent job loss.22 Nevertheless, many permanent separations arise for idiosyncratic
reasons (such as a bad "job match") or as a result of plant-closings or a permanent
reduction in force. In such cases the marginal effect of a firing cost is likely to be
smaller than its effect on short-run cyclical adjustments.
a. Effects of E:werience Rating Over the Business Cycle
Our empirical strategy is to fit models for the probability of unemployment to the
microdata sample described in Table 1, and to include as an explanatory variable the
MTC of the individual's current or most recent employer. We fit separate models for
the incidence of unemployment as a result of a temporary layoff, a permanent job loss,
or some other reason. Despite the discrete nature of the dependent variables we fit
linear probability models by ordinary least squares. These models are computationally
feasible (some of our models have over 180,000 observations and over 500 explanatory
22The distinction between temporary layoffs and permanent job-losses is far from clear-
cut. Workers may begin a spell of unemployment thinking that they have some probability
of recall and only later recognize the situation as a "permanent" job loss.
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variables) and can easily accommodate the potential endogeneity of the measured MTC
for a state and industry (see below).23
Table 2 presents coefficient estimates for models fit to the overall sample (pooling 5
industries, 8 years, and 36 states). The models include a set of person-specific covariates,
as well as dummy variables for the individual's occupation and industry and the year of
the observation. The 3 sets of models in the table differ by whether they include
unrestricted state effects, unrestricted state"year and industry"year interaction effects, or
neither.
The results in columns 1, 4, and 7 suggest that increases in MTC are associated with
significantly lower temporary layoff unemployment rates. The estimated effect is bigger
(more negative) when state effects are included (compare columns 4 and 1) but is very
similar whether or not the state and industry effects are allowed to vary by year
(compare columns 4 and 7). The estimated coefficient in column 1 implies that a change
from an average MTC of 0.68 (the sample average) to full experience rating (MTC =
1.0) would reduce the average layoff unemployment rate by 0.28 percentage points, or
about 20 percent. The estimated coefficients in columns 4 and 7 imply an effect about
twice this big. The latter magnitude is consistent with the estimates presented by Topel
23Angrist (1991) presents an informative analysis of conditions under which an
instrumental variables - linear probability model recovers the "average" effect of an
endogenous regressor.
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(1983, 1985), and suggests that close to one-half of all temporary layoffs are attributable
to incomplete experience rating.24
The estimated effect of VI tax costs on the unemployment rate of permanent job
losers is relatively large when state effects are excluded from the model, but falls
substantially when these are included (compare columns 2 and 5). The estimates in
columns 5 and 8 are only marginally significant and suggest that incomplete experience
rating can account for at most 5 percent (0.15 percentage points) of the unemployment
of permanent job losers. The differing implications of models with and without state
effects for temporary and permanent layoffs indicates an important advantage of our VI
database, which measures experience rating factors by state .ililll industry. Judging by the
estimates in Table 2, fixed interstate differences in temporary and permanent layoff
unemployment rates have very different correlations with measured MTC's, and it may
be inappropriate to ignore these effects.
Regardless of whether state effects are included or excluded, there is no evidence of
any correlation between MTC's and the unemployment rate of non-job-losers (columns 3,
6, and 9). Since quitters and re-entrants are mainly uninsured, this finding suggests that
there is no inherent correlation between measured MTC's and the underlying labor
market conditions in different states and industries.
24Topel (1985) estimates the effect of VI experience rating on the unemployment of full-
time full-year adult men, and uses a slightly different estimate of the MTC that ignores
uncharged benefits and growth rates in employment and the taxable wage base (see the
formulas in Section II). The MTC coefficient in a model similar to the one in column 4,
Table 2 but using Topel's MTC measure is -1.49 (with a standard error of 0.15). The
sample average value of the simpler MTC is 0.71, so the implications of the estimate for the
share of layoffs attributable to incomplete experience rating is the same.
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Table 3 presents linear probability models in which the MTC coefficients are al10wed
to vary across years. (For simplicity we only present models with state or state'year
effects). The MTC coefficients in columns 1 and 4 show a systematic cyclical pattern,
with the largest (negative) effects in the recessionary 1980-82 period and relatively smal1
effects in the peak 1979 and 1986-87 years. This is precisely the pattern predicted by an
adjustment cost model of temporary layoffs. According to such a model, changes in the
MTC of layoffs alter the proportion of a firm's labor force laid off in a demand slump.
In a business cycle downturn we therefore expect to see an increase in the interstate
dispersion in layoff rates generated by differential tax subsidies on VI benefits. Indeed,
the estimated coefficients in the 1980-82 period are surprisingly close to the -3.0 value
predicted by the theoretical model presented in Section I, assuming plausible values for
the demand elasticity and the net replacement rate.
The MTC coefficients in models for the probability of permanent layoff
unemployment also show a slight cyclical pattern, although the coefficients are estimated
relatively imprecisely and vary substantially from year-to-year. In the model with
state"year and industry"year effects (column 5) the largest negative coefficients are
estimated for 1984 and 1985, rather than for the peak-unemployment years. The pattern
of the MTC coefficients in models for non-job-losers (columns 3 and 6) is even more
unsystematic. Again, we interpret the systematic cyclical pattern of the MTC coefficients
for temporary layoffs and the absence of such a pattern for the unemployment rate of
non-job-losers as a useful check on our interpretation of the former.
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Despite the relatively favorable evidence in Tables 2 and 3, the nature of the VI
experience-rating system in most states suggests that caution is required in drawing
causal inferences from the correlation of MTC's and unemployment rates. Each state's
VI financing system sets a maximum payroll tax that is applied to firms with the lowest
reserve or benefit ratios. Firms with the highest insured unemployment rates therefore
face a MTC of O. The implication of this institutional feature is revealed by the inter-
industry pattern of temporary layoffs and MTC's. As shown in Table 1, construction and
durable manufacturing have the highest temporary layoff unemployment rates and the
lowest MTC's. This correlation is driven by the large number of states in which
construction and durable manufacturing are at the maximum tax rate.25 Even within
the 5 industry groups in our analysis it is conceivable that sub-industries with different
propensities to use temporary layoffs are concentrated in certain states, leading to a
spurious negative correlation between MTC's and measured unemployment rates.
One way to overcome this mechanical connection between measured MTC's and the
historical pattern of unemployment in a state is to use national average insured
unemployment rates for the industry to calculate the MTC for each state. This
alternative MTC is independent of the actual unemployment history of firms in the state,
and relies instead on the characteristics of the state tax schedule in combination with the
average characteristics of the industry to assign tax rates.
250f course not every firm is at the same point in the state tax schedule. Our
calculations only apply to a firm whose insured unemployment rates mimic the average rates
for all firrns in the same state and industry.
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Table 4 presents models that use this alternative MTC measure as an instrument for
the actual degree of experience-rating in each state and industry.26 The first 3 columns
give models that are directly comparable to models in columns 4-6 of Table 2. The
instrumental variables (IV) estimates show the same general pattern as the OLS
coefficient estimates, although the estimated effects on temporary and permanent layoffs
are both more negative, while the estimated effect on non-job-losers is more positive. In
no case are the IV estimates statistically different than the OLS estimates, although this
is largely a reflection of the imprecision of the IV estimates.
The models in columns 4-6 of Table 4 are directly comparable to models in columns
1-3 of Table 3. Again the IV estimates are relatively imprecise, making it difficult to
draw strong conclusions. There is certainly no evidence that OLS estimates of the effect
of experience-rating on layoff unemployment are negatively biased (as a reverse-
causation argument would imply). On the other hand, the IV coefficients in column 4 of
Table 4 show no strong cyclical pattern, which could be taken as evidence against our
adjustment-cost interpretation. On balance, however, we believe the IV estimates, taken
together with the other evidence in Tables 2 and 3, provide support for a causal
interpretation of the MTC effects.
The models in Tables 2-4 assume that increases in the MTC of layoffs have the same
effect on employment decisions in different industries. This is a relatively strong
assumption, especially in light of the heterogeneous group of industries in our sample. A
26In calculating the alternative MTC using national average insured unemployment rates
we also ignore the effects of employment growth and non-charged benefits in the state.
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simple way to incorporate heterogeneity is to allow the MTC coefficient to vary by
industry. The results of this exercise (for specifications similar to columns 4-6 in Table
2) are presented in row 1 of Table 5. As might be expected, construction and durable
manufacturing show the largest effects of imperfect experience rating on temporary
layoffs, although in all 5 industries the coefficients are negative and significant. The
MTC coefficients for permanent layoff unemployment are quite variable and (with the
exception of construction) insignificantly different from 0, while the coefficients for non-
job-losers are positive but uniformly insignificant. These coefficients suggest that a move
to complete experience-rating (MTC= 1) would lower temporary layoff unemployment
rates by 1.7 points (or 45 percent) in construction, 0.6 points (or 23 percent) in durable
manufacturing, 0.4 points (or 22 percent) in nondurable manufacturing, 0.3 points (or 43
percent) in trade, and 0.3 points (or 50 percent) in services.
The evidence of a systematic negative effect of experience-rating on temporary layoffs
in trade and services is reassuring, since these industries are far from the maximum tax
rate in all states (indeed they are at the minimum rate in some states). As a result,
MTC's will tend to be higher for trade and service industries in those states that had
above-average insured unemployment rates in the 1980s. This implies a positive
simultaneity bias in our estimate of the effect of VI experience-rating on temporary
layoff unemployment rates in trade and services, rather than the negative bias implied by
the effect of the maximum tax rate. Despite this potential bias, the estimated
coefficients are significantly negative, providing confirmation of a causal effect from
higher MTC's to lower temporary layoff rates.
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Further evidence on inter-industry differences in the effects of experience rating is
presented in rows 2 and 3 of Table 5. Row 2 presents estimates of the MTC coefficient
from models that are fit by industry. Row 3 presents similar coefficients from an IV
estimation scheme, using the MTC calculated with national average insured
unemployment rates as an instrument for each state's MTC. Since MTC is constant for
each state and industry, we cannot include unrestricted state effects in the industry-
specific models. For construction and durable manufacturing, the differences between
rows 1 and 2 are relatively small. For the other three industries the pooled specification
with state effects implies a larger (more negative) MTC effect on temporary layoff
unemployment then the alternative specification, while the industry-specific model
without state effects implies a larger (more negative) MTC effect on the permanent
layoff unemployment rate. This is similar to the pattern in Table 2 for the pooled
models with and without state effects, and may reflect the correlation between
unmeasured state differences and measured MTC's.
With the exception of the results for the construction industry, the IV estimation
results are roughly consistent with the OLS results. The IV estimate of the MTC effect
on temporary layoff unemployment in durable manufacturing is smaller (in absolute
value) than the OLS estimate, while the reverse is true for nondurables, trade, and
services. For the construction industry the IV estimation scheme leads to large and
clearly erroneous coefficients. This is caused by the very weak correlation between
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actual MTC's and the estimated MTC using national average insured unemployment
rates.27
Finally, Table 6 presents estimation results from models that allow separate MTC
coefficients by year and industry. The specifications include unrestricted state ·year and
industry·year effects. For all 5 industries the tax coefficients in the temporary layoff
equation show a systematic cyclical pattern. These patterns are illustrated in Figure 5,
where we have graphed the MTC coefficients from columns 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13 of Table
6. Construction and durable manufacturing show the strongest cyclical variation,
although in every industry the largest tax cost effects are estimated for the 1980-82
period, while the effects for 1979 and 1986-87 are close to O.
By comparison the patterns of the annual coefficients in the permanent layoff and
non-job-loser equations are unsystematic. There is some tendency for more negative
coefficients in the permanent layoff equation in 1980-81, although the coefficients for
1982 and 1983 vary in sign. The coefficients in the model for non-job-losers also vary in
sign, and few are significantly different from zero.
vne difficulty is created by the fact that 2 states (Florida and Texas) have very high
MTC's for construction, but would have 0 MTC's if these states had national-average
insured unemployment rates in construction. Because of the influence of these states, the
correlation of the two MTC measures is close to O.
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b. Effects of Experience Rating Over the Seasonal Cycle
The implications of an adjustment-cost model for the effects of experience-rated DI
taxes apply to seasonal as wen as cyclical demand shocks. Indeed, the simple
deterministic model presented in Section I is probably more appropriate for describing
regular seasonal demand fluctuations than stochastic macroeconomic fluctuations. In this
section we therefore compare the effects of experience-rating in different months of the
calendar year. To preview the results, we find that estimated MTC coefficients have a
systematic seasonal pattern in models for the probability of temporary layoffs, with larger
(more negative) effects in low-demand months. By comparison, the monthly coefficients
from models for the unemployment of permanent job losers and non-job-losers show
little seasonal pattern.
A very simple example of the effect of DI taxes on the seasonal characteristics of
unemployment is provided in Figure 6. Here we present quarterly unemployment rates
for construction workers in 3 groups of Southeastern states: states with very high MTCs
in the construction industry (Florida and Texas); states with moderately high MTCs
(Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee); and the remaining Southeastern states in our
data set (Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and Soutb Carolina), all
of which have 0 MTC in construction. The upper panel of the Figure shows that
temporary layoff unemployment rates have the greatest seasonal variation in the "0
MTC' states, and the lowest seasonal amplitude in the high-cost states. As a check on
the comparability of the groups the lower panel shows quarterly unemployment rates for
non-job-losers, which are very similar across the 3 groups. Assuming that the seasonal
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patterns of temporary layoffs would be the same in the absence of different VI taxes, the
data in the upper panel suggest that a move from a MTC of 0 to a cost of 1 would lower
the temporary layoff unemployment rate in January-March by 3-3.5 percentage points.
This is comparable in magnitude to the estimates in Table 6 for the construction industry
in the highest-unemployment years, and also to the magnitudl implied by our theoretical
calculations, assuming a demand elasticity of -0.3, a benefit replacement rate of 0.5, and
that workers laid off in the first quarter receive an average of 12 weeks of VI benefits.
Although employment and unemployment in construction follow a clear seasonal
cycle, in other industries the monthly pattern of temporary layoffs is more complex.
Figure 7 shows average monthly temporary layoff unemployment rates in durable and
nondurable manufacturing (the upper panel) and trade and services (the lower panel).
These data suggest that durable manufacturing has two seasonal peaks in temporary
layoffs: one in December-January; the other in July-August (corresponding to the
traditional "summer shutdown" in auto assembly and other industries). Trade and
services also have at least 2 seasonal peaks in temporary layoffs. Nondurable
manufacturing, on the other hand, shows little systematic seasonal pattern in temporary
layoffs.
In light of these differing monthly patterns across industries it is impossible to identify
a particular month as either a "high" or "low" demand month. Rather, within each
industry we have ranked the months by the average rate of temporary layoff
unemployment over the 1979-87 period. An individual observation in the CPS sample is
then assigned a "month" (from 1 to 12) based on the rank of the month for the
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individual's industry. Table 7 reports estimated models for the probability of
unemployment that include interactions of MTC with the rank of the month in which the
individual is observed. The models in columns 1, 3, and 5 include state, industry, and
month dummies, while the models in columns 2, 4, and 6 include state"month and
industry"month interactions.
The pattern of the MTC coefficients in the temporary layoff equations is consistent
with an adjustment-cost model of VI tax effects. In the lowest-demand (highest rank)
months, a move from 0 MTC to full experience-rating is predicted to reduce the
temporary layoff unemployment rate by 2.5-3.0 percentage points. In highest demand
(lowest rank) months, the effect is smaller, although still negative and significant. By
comparison, the MTC coefficients show much less of a seasonal pattern in the permanent
layoff equations, and no systematic pattern at all in the non-job-loser equations. We
interpret these estimates as confirming our conclusions based on an analysis over the
business cYcle: both the pattern of the MTC coefficients and their relative magnitudes
are consistent with the evidence in Table 3.
Given the very different seasonal patterns in the 5 different industries in our data
set, we have also analyzed the monthly patterns of temporary layoffs by industry.
Estimation results for industry-specific models are presented in Table 8. In these
specifications the 12 months are grouped into "quarters" on the basis of the (industry-
specific) average temporary layoff rate. We then interact the MTC variable with
indicators for whether the monthly observation is drawn from the 3 highest layoff
months; the 4th-6th highest layoff months; the 7th-9th highest layoff months; or the 3
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lowest layoff months. Since the models are fit by industry, we cannot include state
effects and the full set of 4 quarterly MTC interactions?· Two possible alternatives are
presented in the table. In the models in columns I, 3, 5, 7, and 9, we exclude the state
effects and present MTC coefficient estimates for 4 separate quarters. In the models in
columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 we exclude the MTC'''lowest layoff months" interaction, and
include state effects. These specifications then estimate the additional MTC effect in
each quarter relative to the MTC effect in the lowest-layoff months.
For construction and durable manufacturing the results by either scheme are
consistent with a strong seasonal pattern in MTC effects. Excluding state effects we
estimate a MTC effect of about -1.0 in both industries in the lowest layoff (highest
demand) quarter, and MTC effects in the highest layoff quarter of -4.0 (construction)
and -3.3 (durable manufacturing). When state effects are included we estimate an excess
MTC effect for the highest layoff quarter of -3.2 in construction and -2.1 in durable
manufacturing.
For nondurable manufacturing the models without state effects suggest a negative
MTC effect that is roughly constant in different months. The models with state dummies
show no excess MTC effect in the higher-layoff months. As shown in Figure 7, however,
there is little seasonal variation in layoff rates in durable manufacturing. Given this fact,
the results for nondurables are expected.
For trade and service industries the models without state effects show ()nly limited
seasonality in the MTC coefficients. The models with state dummies show excess MTC
28Recall that MTC is constant for each industry'state cell.
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effects in the highest layoff months for both industries, but the excess effects for the
intermediate months follow a mixed pattern. The estimates for these two industries are
consistent with seasonal variation in the MTC effect, but the patterns are weak relative
to construction and durable manufacturing.
V. Conclusions
The experience-rating provisions of the UI tax system require employers to repay
some fraction of the UI benefits drawn by their former employees. Unemployment
insurance taxes therefore create a firing cost that varies across states depending on the
degree of experience-rating in the state's tax system. We use a simple partial-adjustment
model to study the effects of this firing cost, concentrating on differences over the
demand cycle. An increase in experience-rating is predicted to reduce the fraction of
workers who are laid off in a downturn and reduce the total number of workers who are
hired in an expansion. The combination of these two effects implies that an increase in
experience-rating will dampen observed employment and unemployment responses to
cyclical or seasonal demand shocks.
To test these implications we have developed a new database of UI tax costs for
firms in 5 major industries and 36 states during the 1980s. We use this information
together with individual microdata from the 1979-1987 Current Population Survey to
measure the effects of imperfect experience rating on the probability of temporary layoffs
at different stages of the business cycle and in different months of the year. Our
empirical results suggest that the degree of experience-rating has a substantial effect on
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the probability of layoffs in a downturn or a seasonal trough, but relatively smaller
effects in a cyclical expansion or a seasonal peak. We estimate that a move to complete
experience-rating would reduce the temporary layoff unemployment rate by about 1.0
percentage point (or roughly 50 percent) in the trough of a recession, and would reduce
temporary layoff unemployment in the lowest demand months of the year by about the.
same amount. This magnitude is consistent with plausible values for the labor demand
elasticity in our theoretical model.
We have presented a variety of additional evidence that supports a causal
interpretation of the correlation between VI experience-rating and temporary layoff
unemployment. First, we estimate similar models for the unemployment rates of job
quitters and labor-force re-entrants. Since most of these individuals are uncovered by VI
benefits, the unemployment rate of non-job-Iosers should be unaffected by changes in
experience-rating provisions. On the other hand, general economic conditions in a state
and industry will be reflected in the unemployment rates of non-job-Iosers. Since we find
no relation between experience-rating and unemployment rate of quitters and re-
entrants, we think it is unlikely that our findings for temporary layoffs are driven by a
spurious correlation between tax rates and overall job market conditions.
Second, we have presented instrumental variables estimates that purge the measured
degree of experience-rating for a state and industry from the effects of the particular
unemployment history of firms in that state and industry. Although the instrumental
variables estimates are imprecise, they give no indication of a bias created by the
presence of maximum tax rates for high-unemployment employers. Finally, we have
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analyzed industry-specific results, paying special attention to trade and services. Layoff
rates in these industries are relatively low and very few trade and service employers are
affected by maximum tax rate provisions. For these industries we find a similar pattern
of results as for other industries and for the sample as a whole. On balance, we believe
the evidence provides a strong case that increases in the degree of experience-rating
reduce the utilization of temporary layoffs in cyclical and seasonal slumps.
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APPENDIX 1: CALCULATING THE MARGINAL TAX COST
The steady state MTC for a representative firm is determined in two steps. First,
the firm is placed at the appropriate point on the state tax schedule. Second, given the
slope at that point on the schedule and some other relevant information, the MTC can
be calculated. This appendix will describe in detail the procedures and data used to
accomplish these two steps. For states using the benefit ratio method, placing the
firm on the tax schedule is straightforward. The steady state relationship requires
that benefits paid out equal taxes paid in: lL'B = .,.W. This'" = (W/B)*lL', where lL' is
the steady state unemployment rate, .,. is the steady state tax rate, and W is the taxable
wage base. If.,. is greater than the maximum tax rate T.... or less than the minimum tax
rate Tmin, then the MTC is o. Otherwise, the slope of the tax schedule is a known
constant.







Consider the most common case where T = 3 years. Assuming that taxable wages and
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(A3)
Notice that the left side of equation (A3) is the total tax payment made by a firm in year
t. The discounted change in taxes over time given a change in benefit payments due to
additional layoffs (N,B.J.lJ is given by:
NPV(tax c1w.nge)= a.'-(l+TC~(1 +g)2[1 1 1 ]
3(1 +1) + W + 1+i2
Equation (A4) represents the MTC in a benefit ratio system for firms between the
(A4)
minimum and maximum tax rates. When T = 5 years, we can similarly derive the MTC:
MTC = a.'-(l+TCt l +g)3[ 1 - \1 +I)-S]
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Under a reserve ratio system the steps are similar. The value of the steady state
tax rate is calculated as above. If." > T.... or ." < T.... then the MTC is zero. If neither
of these conditions is true then define the equation of the relevant segment of the tax
schedule as T, = 6 + ~ru where r, is tbe reserve ratio in period t.
The reserve ratio is the ratio of the firm's reserves (RES,) to its average taxable
payroll averaged over the last three years:
RES,







for ;r and g small. A firm's reserves in a given period equals its reserves from the last
period plus receipts less payments:
RES, = RES'_I + ',W!", - alJ.,B!",
Multiplying both sides by (1 +;r)(1 +g)W,N, and manipulating yields:
~1 ~
T, =---=--=--- + (1 +Tt)(1 +g)1:, - a(t +Tt)(1 +g)-w Il,(1 +Tt)(1 +g) ,
Using the equation of the tax schedule:
(A6)
(A7)
Substituting (AS) into (A7):
1: ,>I = 6 - ~T, - (AS)
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6-"+1 6-., B,
-- =-----!...- + (l+lt)(l+g). - a(l+lt)(l+g)---j!~ ~(1 +It)(l +g) , W, '
Multiplying both sides of (A9) by (l+-r)(l+g)NtW,l/l and rearranging yields:
(A9)
Note that the left hand side of this expression equals the total tax payments made by the
firm. Taking the derivative in all future periods with respect to an increase in VI benefit
payments in period t gives the marginal tax cost:
MTC = a(l +It)2(1 +g)2~
1+i
+ a(l +It)2(1 +g)2 ~ (1-(1 +It)2(1 +g)2~)
(1 +1)2













































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Tax schedules Averaged over all
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Figure 3: Distribution of UI Tax Cost
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Table 1
Descriptive Characteristics of Sample
Ourabl. Nondurable
Industry: All Constr M!I M!I Trade Services
1. Avera.e MTC 0.68 0.31 0.85 0.58 0.77 0.75
2. AVI Exper ience 15.5 15.4 18.1 18.3 13.0 15.4
3. Percent Age 16-24 29.3 31. 5 21.1 22.1 39.6 26.0
4. AVI Education 12.3 11.6 12.2 11. 7 12.2 12.9
5. Percent Female 47.9 9.9 31. 8 46.0 50.9 64.5
6. Percent Nonwhite 12.7 10.6 12.0 14.5 11.0 14.5
Unemployment Rates'
7. Temporary Layoff 1. 40 3.77 2.58 2.03 0.72 0.58
8. Permanent Job Loss 3.36 7.21 3.34 3.62 3.10 2.59
9. Other 3.24 3.32 1. 80 2.67 4.28 3.22
10. Number a! States 36 35 34 31 36 36
11. Sample Size 187.598 14.103 31.752 23.392 58,590 59,761
12. Percent a! Total 100.0 7.5 16.9 12.5 31.2 31.9
Note: Sample consists a! individuals in tho labor force (employed or unemployed) in
tho 12 month ly outloing rotation Iroup fil.s a! tho Current Population
Survey Cor each year from 1979 to 1987. Only individuals who report their
current or previous industry .. construction, manufactur ins, trade, or services
aro included. Individuals from 15 state. Cor which tho Ul tax costs oro not
avai lable aro also excluded. lho .ampl. io 0 random 1/2 sample a! tho total
available observat.ions,
! able 2
Lin.ar Probability Mod.ls for the Lik.elihood of Unemployment
(atandard .rrora in par.nth•••• )
Cau•• of T.mp Perm T.mp P.rm T8mp P.rm
Unemploym.nt: Layoff Layoff Other Layoff Layoff Other Layoff Layoff Other
(1) (2) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6) (7) (8 ) (9 )
1. HTe (xl00) -0.88 -0.93 0.12 -1.59 -0.42 0.34 -1. 61 -0.46 0.32
(0.08) (0.12 ) (0.12 ) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24 ) (0.16 ) (0.24) (0.24)
2. Exp.rience 0.25 1. 51 -1. 04 0.24 1. 49 -1.02 0.22 1. 48 -1. 03
(xl000) (0.08 ) (0.12) (0.12 ) (0.08) (0.13 ) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13 ) (0.12 )
3. Exp-Squared -0.54 -3.32 0.89 -0.34 -3.48 0.89 -0.31 -3.46 o . 90
(xl00,OOO) (0.16 ) (0.25) (0.24) (0.16 ) (0.25) (0.24) (0.16 ) (0.25) (0.24)
4. Yout.h (xl00) 0.19 1.64 1.24 0.19 1. 61 1.24 0.18 1.61 1. 23
(0.09) (0.14 ) (0.14 ) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14 ) (0.09) (0.14 ) (0.14 )
5. Y.. Educ -0.07 -0.30 -0.15 -0.08 -0.30 -0.15 -0.08 -0.30 -0.15
(xl00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
8. ramal. (xl00) 0.20 -1. 19 1. 60 0.19 -1. 18 1. 58 0.20 -1.18 1.58
(0.08) (0.10 ) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10 ) (0.10 ) (0.08) (0.10 ) (0.10 )
7. Nonwhit.e (xl00) 0.08 3.25 1.95 0.28 3.23 2.00 0.28 3.24 2.00
(0.08) (0.13 ) (0.12 ) (0.09) (0.13 ) (0.13 ) (0.09) (0.13 ) (0.13 )
9th,r Control Variabl,s'
8. St.ate Eff.ct. No No Y.. Y.. Y.. Y..
(35 .tat.•• )
9. St.at.,*Y.ar and No No Y.. No No Y.. No No Ya.
Ind*Year Eff.cta
10. R-.quar.d 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.019
Notea: Sample conaiat.. of individual, in tho labor ·force ( employed or unemployed) who
report t.heir current or previous industry .. either constZ'uction. manufacturinl,
trad', or ,ervic.a. S•• Tabla 1 for aource of data, Th. depandent variable, a..
indicat.or. for unemployment statuI .. .r'lult. of temporary layoff, permanent job
10", or oth.r reason, All models include 9 occupation dummi •• , 4 indu.try dummia • .
.nd 8 year effects in addition to tho control variable. li.ted.
Toble 3
Marginal Tax Cost Coefficients in Models
for the Problbility of Unemployment



































( 0 • 25)
- 2.20



























- 0 • 5 8
(0.41)
• 0.19

































- 2. 0 1
(0.48 )





( 0 . 50)
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Tes
Notes: See note to Table 2. Al l models include 9 occupation dummies, 4
industry dummies, 8 year effects and the covariates listed in rows
2-7 of Table 2.
Table 4
Instrumental Variables Estimates of
Marginal rax Cost Coefficients in Models
for the Probability of Unemployment
(standard errors in parentheses)
CaUliiil of Temp Perm
Unemployment: Layoff Layoff Other
(1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
I. "Te ( x 1 00) • 2 . B1 • 1 .52 o .90



















.3. 10 • 1 .62 0.7B
(1. B6) (2. B4 ) (2.79 )
.3. 0 1 ·1 .70 0.59
(1. B6) (2. B6) (2. Bl )
·3.07 • 1.49 0.26
(1. B6) (2. B5) (2. B1)
• 2.47 • 3. 7B 1 .66
(1. B6) (2. B5 ) ( 2 • BI )
• 2.62 • 1. 55 0.91
(1. B6) ( 2 • B5 ) (2. BO)
·2.9B • 2 • 22 0.44
(1.B7> (2. B6) ( 2 • B2 )
• 2 • 65 • 1.60 1 .21
(1.B7> (2.B7> (2. B2 )
• 1 .96 o.06 I .45
(1. B4) ( 2 • B3 ) ( 2 • 7 B)
• 2.90 0.49 I .47
( I . B4 ) (2. B3) ( 2 . 7 B)
Notes: See not.e to Table 2. At l models include 9 occupation dummies, 4
industry dummies, 8 year effects, state dummies, and the covariates
listed in rows 2~7 of Table 2. Models are estimated by instrumental
variables, using IS an instrument for HIe (in columns '·3) an
estimate of HIe for the state and industry using national insured
unmeployment rates, and using as instruments for the interactions of
MTC and year dummies (columns 4~6) the interlctions of the
alternative MTC with year dummies. See text.
Table 5
Linear Probabil ity Hodels for the Likel ihood of U""""loyment, By Industry
(standard errors in parenthesis)
Construct i on Durable Hfg Nondurable Hfg Trade Services
Cause of T~ Perm T~ Perm T~ Perm T~ Perm T~ Perm
Un~'t: layoff layoff Other layoff layoff Other layoff layoff Other layoff layoff Other layoff layoff Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
coefficients from Pooled Hodel:
1- HTC -2.45 -1.28 0.10 -1.68 0.69 0.73 -, .05 -0.64 0.51 -1.35 '0.71 0.34 -1.09 -0.03 0.06
(xl00) (0.23) (0.35) (0.34) (0.25) (0.38) (0.37) (0.23) (0.35) (0.35) (0.28) (0.42) (0.42) (0.23) (0.35) (0.34)
coefficients from Industry-Specific Hodels:
Estimated by OlS
2. HTC -2.30 -1.96 0.14 -'.56 -0.34 0.26 -0.45 '1.52 0.29 -0.46 -1.25 0.10 -0.23 '0.29 0.00
(xl00) (0.32) (0.43) (0.30) (0.27) (0.31) (0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.28) (0.12) (0.24) (0.28) (0.09) (0.19) (0.21)
Estimated by Instrumental Variables
3. HTC ·26.83 23.23 3.92 -0.27 -0.90 0.29 -, .28 -1.40 0.39 -1.17 -1.56 0.59 -0.52 -0.61 0.27
(xl00) (8.86) (11.20) <7.05) (0.44) (0.50) (0.37) (0.38) (0.50) (0.43) (0.18) (0.38) (0.44) (0.44) (0.27) (0.31)
Note: See notes to Table 2. Hodels in row 1 are fit to all 5 industries simultaneously, with an interaction of
industry and HTC. These models include unrestricted state effects. Hodels in rows 2 and 3 are fit by
industry, and exclude state effects. Instrumental variables estimates use HTC calculated with national
average insured ~loyment rate as an instrument for the HTC (see text). S~le sizes and means of
dependent variables are given in Table ,.
ratll1 •
H.rliJ:ul Tox COlt. Coe!!lclel:lt. 11:1 Hochll tor • ho Protlatl111ty o! Uaa.ploYllllnt
(Itandard arror. 1n parlAthllil)
Coaltruc:ti ... a Duratlh H'I Nonduratlla H!. r~ad. SlrvlC:I'
Caul. rllllil Parlll rllllp P.rlll r ••p Par. rllllp Per_ r'lIlp Plrlll
0' Lay...!! Layo!! Other Layo!! Layot! Other Layo!! Layo!! Other Layo!! Layo!! Other Layo!! Layo!! Othar
Un••p't: (1) (z) (3) (4) (" (0) (7) (I) (0) (l0) (11) OZ) 03} (lit) (U)
HIC (! lO 91 Inttt.ctpd wah Xllr uH1 InduHFY:




l.lS' -o.n -0.i4 0.01 -O.ZI 0.12 0.13 0.04 a.'" -0.81
(D. e7) (1.0J) (1. 01) (o.n) (1 01) (1.01t) (0. ") (O.ilI) (1.00) (0.81) (1. ZO) (1. Z4) (0.17 ) (1.01) (1.00)
lila -3.7Z -loU -0. 0' -3.
"
-1 31 1. .. ~ 1. 18 -Z,O' -1.12 -Z.31 -1.11 0.40 -1.'7 0.07 O,Zl





1.n 2,31 -1.'3 -0 .Z7 0.07 -1.7Z 0.42 o,Je -Z,12 1. '1 1 ..
co '0) (1 01) CO.
."
" '"
(1.04) (1. OZ) (0.66) (1.00) (l,00) (0.711) (l.20) (1.11) (0.1') (1. 00) (0. .,
liU -Z.U -0.34 -0 ... -3.1t7 O.Oi 1. all -Z .lSi -0,11 Z .'0 -2.11 -0.81 1.113 -1.'7 O. " 0.33
(0.7Z) (0.11) (1 00) (0.71) (1.13) (l. 14) (0.7Z) (1.11 ) (l.01) (O,U) 0.30) (l.ZII) (O.U) (1. Oil) (1,04)
1iii3 -Z.66 0.76 O. .. -0.72 -O.iO -1.1' -Z.ltl ILZi -0.71 -1.i4 -3 OI O. Zl -1.7Ii1 -Z ,10 -0.81
(0.1Ii) (1. 0') (1. 04) (O.H) (l.1') 0.13 ) (0.0i) (l.07) (1.03) (O.U) (1 .B) (1.Z4) (O.U) (l. Q4) (1. 01)
lU4 -3. Z3 -Z.IIJ -1.11 -Z,4i -0.'1 -1.7e -l.U -Z.Zl -1.71 -l.ao -3.0' -z.n -1.11 -1.71 -Z. '6
(0. &7) (1. OJ) (1. 01) (0.76) 0.16) (1. lit) (Q.72) ( loll) (1. Oil) (0.8') (1,Zi) (1. ZII) (0. Ii) (1.01) (1. Olt)
111II' -Z O. -3 .eo -O.B -1.4' -0. D7 0.04 Q.71 -1. I' Z.70 -0.71 -g.
"
-0.71
-a.'" -l.U 1, ZII
Cg '7) (1 gZ) (1. QO) (0.75) (1. 17) (1.0Q) (O.H) (l.12) (l,10) (0.80) (1 zO) (1.30) (0.70) (1.0.) (1.06)
au -0.71 -2.0' 0.21 1. 02 Q.U -0,01 1.Z1 1.41 Z.U 0.3' 0,48 1." 0.13 o ,Z' 1.21
(0.72) (1. 011) (1.01) (0.7') (l,ZO) (0,12) (O.h) (1.13) (1.10) (0,11) 0,31) 0.211) (0.70) 0.011) 0.0')
111I7 -0.33 0.7' -0.31 -0.4Q 4,47 Z.41 -0, iI 0.23 0.16 -a .17 1. 'Q O. O. -0,'0 1.'7 -0.110
(o.n) (1. 04) (1.03) (0.10) (1. Zl) (1.lll) (Q,73) (1.10) 0.10) (0.14 ) (l.311 (1.33) (0.11I) 0.07) (l. 0')
Mota: rabl. ~.port. ..tl.atld cOI!!hl.ntl o! Hre va~ilbll lD lin.a~ probability .odll 'or tho lU:ll1bood o!
uAI.plo7C.At a.oDI ladlv1duall .. .ho latlo~ !O~CI . Hodell .U ,,. '0 III , iDdu.t~ill 11lDultanloully,
.0' iDClud. Itat.·y.a~ ... lAdul t~y·Yla~ e!!.c:tl ,. addition '0 tho c:ont~ol va~1abl.. liltld .. Iatlh z.
Table 7
Mar,inal Tax Coat Coafficiant. in Hod.l. for Probability of. Unemploym.nt
By Month .nd R••son for Unemploym.nt
(stand.rd errors in p.r.nth•••• )
T.mporary L.yoffa' Oth.r
(1)















































































































































































Not.s: S.a T.ble and not .. to Tabla 2 for dafinition. of d.pandant variable., m••n.
and standard deviations of dap.ndant variabl•• , .nd li.t of othar control
vari.ble.. Months are rankad by indu.stry on the b •• is of av.ra,. monthly
temporary layoff unemploym.nt rat. ov.r the 1979-87 period.
H.rain.l Tn: co.t Ca.!Uchntl ~n Hod.l. for the Probability o! T.mporary Layo!!
Ily Indul try .nd Hon th
(atand.rd .rrara in p.r.ntb•••• )
Conatruction Durabl. Hfa Nondur.ble H!a Trade Service.
(1) (2) (3) (0) (6) (7) ( 8) (.) (10)




















































E!!.ct.. : No Y.. No Y.. No Y.. No Y.. No v..
Kot ... : Tabl. raporta •• timated cae!!1chnta o! HTC variable in linaar probability model tor
tbe lik.libood o! a tamporary leyo!! .monl individuals in the l.bor force o! th •
• ppropriat. indultry. S•• Tabl•• tor ....pl. si••s, m••n. o! tbe d.p.nd.nt variabl•• ,
and li.t a! ath.r included covariatn. In colu.lllD.a 2, ., 6, a, and 10 the HTC*(3 Lownt
Layo!! Hontha) co.!Uchnt 1a norm.lind to O. Honth. ar. rank.d by industry on the
baah o! avaral. monthly taG:!por.ry layoff u.n.mployment rat.. over the 1&7&-87 period.
